On the causes and consequences of Hedonic Adaptation by Perez Truglia, Ricardo Nicolas
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
On the causes and consequences of
Hedonic Adaptation
Ricardo Nicolas Perez Truglia
Harvard University
29. July 2009
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/23080/
MPRA Paper No. 23080, posted 6. June 2010 02:26 UTC
ON THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF HEDONIC ADAPTATION
RICARDO PEREZ-TRUGLIA
Harvard University, Department of Economics
Abstract. Sensations have both discriminative and a¤ective components. The a¤ective com-
ponent faces special restrictions when fullling warning and defense roles (e.g. pain, fever).
As a result, Nature must design self-regulatory utility functions (i.e. hedonic adaptation).
Our evolutionary theory gives deeper foundations to the existing models of Robson (2002) and
Rayo and Becker (2005). But only our theory can accommodate the wide variation in rates of
adaptation across sensations. Indeed, identifying such variation is crucial for the welfare and
policy implications. Finally, we provide an application to the psychological defenses, whose
predictions are consistent with the region- paradox (Gilbert et al., 2004).
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1. Introduction
In economics there are two usual meanings behind the term utility. On the one hand we
have decision utility, which is inferred from observed choices in Samuelsons Revealed Action
spirit. On the other hand we have Benthams concept of experienced utility, which refers to
the actual feelings of pleasure and pain (from now on, sensations) that an organism experiences
in response to certain stimuli. Behavioral economists are studying an increasing number of
situations in which decision and experienced utility deviate from each other in a systematic
way: e.g. Kahneman et al. (1997), Beshears et al. (2008),1 Robson and Samuelson (2010),
etc. One of the most popular deviations is known as hedonic adaptation: i.e. hedonic states
systematically bounce back to normal levels. There is plenty of multi-disciplinary evidence
in that regard, both for humans and non-humans (see Frederick et al. 1999 for an extensive
review). People seem to adapt to many life events, ranging from lottery windfalls to terminal
illnesses. However, those deviations are interesting insofar they have important welfare and
policy implications. Unfortunately, the economic literature has not been clear on that respect.
We will obtain more precise welfare implications by working with the deep biological basis of
hedonic adaptation.
Section 2 presents a model of the principal-agent problem between Nature and men as a
metaphor for evolution. The model is based on a couple of well-documented biological facts. In
Thanks to David Laibson, Rafael Di Tella, Daniel Heymann and Nicolas Bottan for useful discussions. The usual
disclaimer applies.
1They use the terms revealed preferences and normative preferences.
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particular, we show that some sensations face special restrictions on their a¤ective component,
because they need to full warning and defense roles (e.g. pain, fever). We show that Nature nds
optimal to use self-regulatory utility functions, which people document as hedonic adaptation.
To the best of our knowledge, Robson (2002) was the rst to propose a theory of the evolutionary
origin of hedonic adaptation by comparing the adaptive utility function to a voltmeter.2 Later
Rayo and Becker (2005) provided a fully-eshed model. Our evolutionary theory makes at
least two important contributions. Contrary to the former, our model can explain why some
sensations adapt strongly (e.g. dopamine) while others almost do not adapt at all (e.g. irritant
sense, pain). Indeed, we exploit the empirical evidence on di¤erential adaptation to perform a
test our model. Di¤erential adaptation is not a minor issue, because it has important welfare and
policy implications.3 Indeed, the second contribution is to identify those welfare implications.
In Section 3 we discuss the welfare and policy implications of the model. We show that
hedonic adaptation can elicit ine¢ cient behavior only if people fail to forecast that hedonic
states will bounce back to normal levels, even after having experienced them in the past (i.e. if
people are not "sophisticate"). If that was the case, people would over-invest in activities that
adapt relatively more (i.e. those without warning and defense roles). Indeed, psychologists have
presented a lot of evidence on the inability to anticipate adaptation. Finally, we provide as an
application a model of the psychological defenses. The predictions are perfectly consistent with
the region- paradox, one of the leading theories in psychology (Gilbert et al., 2004). All in all,
we hope that our model will give further theoretical support for the gradual incorporation of
adaptive utility functions into theoretical and empirical applications in economics (e.g. income
aspiration, consumption habituation).
2. Causes of Hedonic Adaptation
2.1. The genesis of sensations. The quest for happiness is thought as the main concern for
every individual. Nevertheless, we must bear in mind that happiness has been an evolution-
ary mean and not an end for mankind: Nature developed an incentive scheme of prizes and
punishments to drive human behavior towards greater tness. Think of evolution itself as a
principal-agent problem where Nature is the principal and the individual is the agent. Nature
chooses preferences for the individual through her biological design in such a way as to maximize
Natures own preferences: reproduction and survival of the species. We have pleasure and pain
centers all over our brain our body designed to carefully guide human behavior: taste, hormone
secretion, emotions, and so on (Cabanac, 1971).4 The idea of experienced utility had exactly
2Robson (2002): "To obtain an accurate reading from this device, it is necessary to rst estimate the range in
which the unknown voltage falls. Only if the right range is selected on the device, such that the needle moves to
the middle of the scale, is an accurate reading obtained."
3Also, the analysis in Rayo and Becker (2005) rest entirely on the assumption that is actually an outcome of our
model: that organisms cannot perceive small di¤erences in sensations. Far from concluding that the explanation
is incorrect, we provide deeper foundations.
4Individuals do not need to consciously and rationally maximize pleasure and minimize pain. The "optimization"
can take place thorough learning or natural selection.
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this spirit. However, some economists prefer to work only with decision utility, disregarding the
possibility of physical correlates.
The abstraction given by the concept of decision utility is extremely useful for the analysis of
a great number of problems concerning human action. Nevertheless, studying the link between
decision and experienced utility will increase the number of behavioral phenomena that we are
able to address with the traditional toolbox. Also, even though economists make a great e¤ort
not to mention it explicitly, in practice the criteria to compare outcomes is either utilitarianism
or some variation of it. A better understanding of the link between decision and experienced
utility will provide more accurate welfare analysis. For instance, hyperbolic discounting is one
the most popular applications of the divorce between decision and experienced utility (e.g. see
the application in Angeletos et al., 2001).
Hereafter we dene sensations as normal reactions of the organism to external stimuli. We
will follow everyday examples of stimuli (e.g. eating, getting injured) and sensations (e.g. taste,
pain).5 Despite it might sound awkward, all sensations take place in our brains. Hirayama et
al. (1995) illustrates this perfectly. They stimulate the genitals of completely paralyzed men to
produce erections and even ejaculations. Since their brains never get the message, the patients
nd no satisfaction at all. However, the same patients can experience orgasms by just stimulating
the right pleasure centers of their brains. The information about the external environment is
perceived by the individual through certain number of sensitivities. Cabanac (1971) notices
that some sensitivities give rise to a phenomenon of consciousness that attaches a¤ective aspect,
described in common language as pleasure or displeasure. But not all stimuli evoke a¤ective
content. For instance, the mere action of seeing is neither pleasant nor unpleasant by itself,
even though the cognitive processing of the images may carry a¤ective content.6 In a similar
characterization, Young (1959) distinguishes between discriminative and a¤ective dimensions
of sensations. In what follows we refer to sensations as the e¤ective content of the sensitive
experience.
The rst building block of the model is the fact that some sensations have additional and even
more important roles than guiding behavior: as warning and defense mechanisms. For example,
when you touch the prickle of a rose the motivational role of pain is to provide disincentives
to avoid touching it in the future. The warning role is to draw the attention of the individual
to trigger an immediate response and then avoid being injured any further.7 The a¤ective
component of the motivational and warning roles di¤er in a very important way. If Nature wants
to guide the behavior of an individual, she has to shape the relative intensity of his sensations.
An individual will follow action A instead of B because the pleasant sensation triggered by A
5Stimuli comprise more complex external inuence, like information. Similarly, as sensations you can think of
complicated mental and hormonal arrangements, such as emotions.
6Cabanac (1971) noticed that sensitivity is objective while the a¤ective content depends upon the environment
(he called this alliesthesia).
7In both cases Nature wants to make us respond to stimuli, and then there is a motivational role. However, in
the rst case Nature wants to motivate future actions, while in the rst case Nature wants to motivate immediate
action.
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is relatively more intense than that of action B, regardless of the absolute level of intensity. On
the contrary, if Nature wants to build a warning system, she needs to provide an individual with
intense sensations (in an absolute sense). The stronger the sensation the quicker the individual
will react and therefore the greater the chances of preventing further harm. If pain was weak
then people would fall asleep on snow and die from hypothermia, or they would frequently die
from bleeding because they would not notice that they have a wound.
This is a subtle di¤erence, but critical for the model that follows. It is not a conjecture, but an
stylized biological fact that comes from the interesting research of Sternbach (1963) and Cabanac
et al. (1969). Those sensations with defense or warning roles (e.g. pain) causes most of us,
most of the time, to avoid sprains, fractures, burns and other injuries that would otherwise leave
us crippled and open to severe infections. If you "turned down" the intensity those sensations
the individual would not stand any chances of surviving, not even in modern times. Indeed,
Sternbach (1963) shows that individuals in modern times with a very rare congenital syndrome
called indi¤erence to pain are almost all dead by their mid-thirties. For instance, young children
with this syndrome have among other things mutilated themselves by chewing o¤ their ngers
and their tongues, and by su¤ering severe burns when leaning against stoves or sitting in scalding
baths (e.g. Madonick, 1954). If sensations with defense roles had not been intense during our
evolutionary history (i.e. millions of years ago), our species would have not stood any chance
at all.
The alternative assumption made in the literature is that of Rayo and Becker (2005), and
followed by others, who assume that an organism cannot perceive small di¤erences in sensations.
Cabanac et al. (1969) provided strong evidence in favor of our assumption. They showed that
people with indi¤erence to pain feel all the stimuli applied to them, including what normal
subjects describe as painful. They can detect being burning, pricked or pinched, but they do not
feel such experiences as unpleasant (i.e. they have the discriminative part of the sensation, but
not the a¤ective component). This example illustrates our point perfectly: we do not make any
assumption about people not being able to di¤erentiate between small changes in sensations (i.e.
in relative terms). The only assumption we make is that the a¤ective component must be intense
(i.e. in absolute terms) as to let sensations satisfy their defense and warning roles. Furthermore,
later we will show that our assumption will have as direct consequence the assumption made by
Rayo and Becker (2005).
The principle behind the defense systems is identical to that of warning systems. Take fever
as an example. Its motivational role is giving incentives to avoid the kind of actions that led to
the fever in the rst place. However, the most important role of fever is to force the individual
to rest. If fever (or any other defense mechanism) was weak, then people would be able to ignore
the message from their organisms and expose themselves to serious harm.8 In modern times we
can live without some defense systems: indeed, we ask doctors for drugs to ignore the messages
pre-programmed by Nature (like vomit or fever), sometimes because with the modern standards
8Technically they are both motivational roles. We use di¤erent terms to distinguish that in the former Nature
wants to motivate future decisions while in the latter Nature needs to "enforce" an immediate reaction.
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of living it is indeed reasonable to ignore some messages from our body. However, the lack of
defense systems would have been fatal during our evolutionary time, and even some hundred
years ago. Both the defense and warning roles of sensations are "paternalistic" devices installed
in humans and nonhumans to deal with limited intelligence, cognition, asymmetric information,
etc. (Perez Truglia (in progress)). It is not surprising that economists have long ignored the
defense roles of sensations, since even some physicians seem to ignore the defense function for
diarrhea, fever, and others: Neese et al. (1994) called this the "Clinicians Illusion."
The second building block of our evolutionary theory is the fact that sensations that are very
intense (i.e. in absolute terms) can be very costly from a tness point of view.9 At rst you
may not realize how costly intense sensations could be, simply because Nature did a great job.
Our sensations are not a function of stimuli (e.g. consumption), but a function of deviations
with respect to a benchmark (e.g. consumption aspirations). In this way Nature can motivate
us almost unrestrictedly in spite of using sensations whose intensities are bounded above and
below.10 First of all, very intense sensations (positive or negative) would critically diminish
our state of awareness. For instance, if we experienced sensations ten times more intense than
an orgasm in response to ordinary stimuli like eating a berry, we would not be able to focus
properly. Specially during our evolutionary time, when that would have made us an easy prey
for any lucky predator. There are more direct negative e¤ects from very intense sensations:
e.g. Sapolsky (1999) documents some of the adverse consequences of intense unhappiness for
humans and nonhumans.
A deeper biological foundation for this assumption is based on the functioning of our brain.
Sensations work through chemical reactions (e.g. the release of neurotransmitters), and more
intense sensations (for a given motivational task) imply a waste of energy. Moreover, extra
brain activity would produces heat, and one key goal throughout the brain evolutionary history
has been to minimize heat production. Compared to the brain, the microprocessor in any
modern computer is an extremely ine¢ cient computer, because it gets very hot by solving
simple problems (Montague, 2006). Since the upsurge of the rst multi-cellular organisms the
brain has been evolving as an extremely elegant organ: e.g. todays supercomputers, such as
Blue Gene, can achieve the same number of operations per second than the brain but consuming
as much power as 1,200 US households, while the brain only consumes 100 watts (as much as a
laptop computer). Hedonic adaptation is just one of the many adaptive mechanism in the brain
that are meant to minimize heat and energy consumption.11 Neuroscientists recognized long
ago the presence and importance of inhibitory neurotransmitters. For example, without the
GABA inhibition neurotransmitter the neurons would continuously send out actions potentials
and would "eventually literally re themselves to death" (LeDoux, 2002).
9This assumption is similar in spirit to that of Rayo and Becker (2005).
10Indeed, addicts to drugs that boost rewards way over the "usual" levels (e.g. cocaine) end up inicting
irreversible damage to those systems.
11But in spite of its elegancy, the brain of an average adult human represents approximately 2% of the total
body weight but still consumes approximately 20% of the energy (Clark and Sokolo¤, 1999).
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We can nally put the pieces together. When endowing organisms with sensations Nature
faces a problem of asymmetric information, since a particular organism may be exposed to
diverse scenarios (e.g. abundance of scarcity of food, bad or good weather). We will not study
the process of natural selection itself, but we will describe the limiting outcome by means of
the principal-agent problem, as in Samuelson (2004), Becker et al. (2005), Smith and Tasnádi
(2007), among others.12 Nature chooses a utility function, U(c), where c 2 C is the consumption
vector of the individual. The consumption is a result of the decisions of the individuals (x 2 X)
given the characteristics of the environment (z 2 Z). The function mapping x and z to c is:
c = f(x; z). The tness function for Nature is given by V (c), which is always of dimension one.13
The characteristics of the environment (z) are not known ex-ante to Nature. In the jargon of
the principal-agent problem, U() represents the incentive payment and z is hidden information
to the principal.
There are two implicit simplications. In the rst place, both the tness function and the
utility function depend directly on c. In richer models of evolution the utility function would
be over goods that are only intermediate from a biological viewpoint (for details see Robson,
2001a, b). Secondly, in a richer model we would want V () to also depend directly upon some
elements of z. We simplify those aspects because they are not essential to the results that follow.
In the general case U(c) is a vector, where each one of its elements corresponds to a di¤erent
sensation. The multi-dimensionality of sensations is a key aspect for our results, but we will
start with a one-dimensional example. In what follows we assume that f() and V () are such
that the problem for Nature has a unique global maxima in X for every z 2 Z.
The prefrontal cortex is the very front of the human brain, located right beneath the forehead.
It is the brain center most strongly implicated in qualities like intelligence. The neocortex ap-
peared with the early mammals, and has expanded greatly in size throughout hominid evolution:
in the last three million years the human brain tripled in size, mainly because the growth of
the frontal lobe and its prefrontal cortex (Banyas, 1999). Nevertheless, evolution seems to have
build the neocortex right on top of other structures in the brain. In terms of Allman (1999): "the
brain can never be shut down." All the old control systems must remain in place and functional
while new ones evolve. Regulation of limb movement and blood chemistry remains as essential
for our proper functioning as it was for early amphibians and for our rodent-sized forebears who
ate the eggs of dinosaurs (Ehrlich, 2000). A similar principle applies to other ancient parts of
the brain like the amygdala (i.e. related to emotions) and the hypothalamus (related to sexual
desire and other appetites).
Because of the history of the brain, hedonic adaptation is probably the result of evolutionary
forces way before the appearance of the rst hominids. Indeed, hedonic adaptation has been
widely studied in animals: e.g. Yadid et al. (2001) suggests that limbic dopaminergic adaptation
12Even though the metaphor is useful for illustrative purposes, the reader should not think about organisms with
and without regulation systems competing with each other. Hedonic adaptation is not a secondary feature of
the brain, but a consequence of its deep foundations.
13You could take any monotonically increasing transformation of V (c) and it would still represent the same
tness function.
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is the homeostatic process behind depression in rats. When we say that the agent is solving
a maximization problem, it can be interpreted as rational human, an animal following a basic
learning mechanism, or an even simpler life form (for details see Perez Truglia (in progress)).
However, if the reader wants to accompany our model with a story, you can think about our
ancestral hunter-gather environment.14 A primitive hunter chooses the time to spend in hunting
(x), which depending on the abundance of prey and climate conditions (z) will result in two
outcomes: physical damage and calorie intake (c).
Up to this point, Nature would simply choose U(c) = V (c) (or any monotonic transformation):
the individual maximizes U(f(x; z)) = V (f(x; z)) and then chooses exactly the consumption
that maximizes Natures tness. Notice that Nature can achieve the First Best in spite of not
observing z. However, as discussed before, intense sensations are costly from a tness point of
view. To represent this we will let the tness be given by: V (c)  L(U(c)), where the function
L() is the shadow cost in tness from experiencing intense sensations. The function L() is
nonnegative (both positive and negative sensations are costly) and convex: i.e. the marginal
harm would be practically zero if sensations were mild, but if the individual was about to
pass out from pain, the marginal harm would be rather large. Natures goal may not be to
completely neutralize sensations: in term of tness it may be optimal to provide on average
positive or negative amounts of some sensations. This could be easily incorporated to the model
by simply translating L(). Also, an alternative would be to assume that sensations are bounded
above and below. The results and intuitions of the model would be exactly the same.
There are two ways in which we can "test" the assumption that L() is convex. First, if
L() was concave then Nature would have found it optimal to design a system of "stochastic"
sensations: i.e. you would feel almost innitely-intense sensations with almost zero probability.
Secondly, if L() was concave then Nature would have found it optimal to hard-wire sensations
with innitely large intensities but innitely short length. For the sake of simplicity, we leave the
duration of sensations for later. Facing the tness cost given by L(), Nature would simply pick
U(c) = V (c), where  is an scalar arbitrarily close to zero.15 Since all the relevant information
is ordinal, Nature can avoid tness costs by simply normalizing the individuals utility function.
However, letting U(c) = V (c) is not a valid answer when some sensations play a secondary
role: the tness of the organism depends directly on the intensity of sensations with defense
roles, and thus weak sensations would compromise its survival.
In practice we have a multiplicity of sensations: i.e. U(c) is multidimensional. This is a
biological fact, not an assumption of the model. There is a simple evolutionary explanation.
From the perspective of decision theory, we know that under regularity conditions preferences
can be represented by a unidimensional utility function. However, we are implicitly assuming
that the agent knows its own preferences. In practice, the need for multiplicity of sensations
14Humans lived as hunter-gatherers for the vast majority of their evolutionary history: the genus Homo has
existed for about 2 million years, while agriculture originated only 10,000 years ago and has been practiced by
the majority of the worlds population for just 3,000 years, a relatively brief period of time for selection to act
(Ehrlich, 2000).
15We could scale V (c) directly.
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arises because the agent needs to infer causal links between its decisions and its sensations.
Indeed, this is explicitly stated in the very denition of an economic good: "such properties as
render the thing capable of being brought into causal connection with the satisfaction of this
need" (Menger, 1871). If experienced utility was unidimensional, that would be very di¢ cult.
For instance, the agent usually faces dozens of stimuli at the same time, and some of them
(e.g. pride) have rewards that are spread over time, so he would not be able to distinguish the
marginal contributions to experienced utility of each stimulus on a separate basis. Even though
a rational individual may still be able to learn some causal links by experimentation (when
possible), that possibility does not extend to simpler life forms.1617
For the sake of simplicity, lets assume that the organism is endowed with only two sensations.
The second element of U(c), U2(c), will represent those sensations that have also defense and
warning roles (e.g. pain, fever). The rst element, U1(c), will not have such secondary roles.
Since experienced utility is multi-dimensional, there must be a one-dimensional "hedonic metric"
representing preferences over sensations, S(U(c)). Consider the simplest case: S(U(c)) = U1(c)+
U2(c).18 In other words, S(U(c)) (or any monotone transformation) is the decision utility. Note
also that the utility function is not separable in the usual sense, since each Ui(c) can depend on
overlapping subsets of c. Indeed, both theory and evidence from neuroscience suggest that such
interrelations exist (Camerer et al., 2005).
We need to incorporate into the model the fact that defense and warning roles depend directly
on the intensity of sensations. For instance, we could add an additional term to the tness
function, G(U2(c)), to represent the benets from warning and defense roles. For instance,
a decision utility with U^2 < ", with " very small, would represent that people can recognize
when they are being burned (i.e. they have the discriminative component of the sensation),
but the a¤ective content is absent. As a consequence, pain does not play its warning role and
the organism is doomed to extinction: G(U^)   1. Denote Uf2 () to the experienced utility
that would arise if Nature was only interested in optimizing the warning and defense roles. For
example, if U2() is fever then Uf2 () is exactly intense enough as the individual will be compelled
to rest when sick. We will simply assume that U2() is xed in Uf2 (c), and Nature solves the
16We believe that even a human in modern times would have a very hard time guring out its own preferences
with unidimensional experienced utility. Not to mention our hunter-gatherer. As a window to the state of
culture during our evolutionary history, consider the indigenous culture of the Trobriand Islands (Melanesia):
the prehistoric migration that populated these islands broke o¤ from the migration that peopled Europe possibly
more than 100,000 years ago, and their ancestral culture was separated from Europes even earlier than was that
of Native Americans. Causal links were indeed very di¢ cult to infer: e.g. their natives had not understand the
causal link between sex and reproduction (Wright, 1994).
17A related question is why we seem to have a nite number of sensations. In the rst place, natural selection
needs long periods of time to develop sensations. But even if time is not the limitation, having additional
sensations is costly in terms of tness (because complexity always is). Additionally, the processing capacity of
our brain is limited. For example, our eyes can transmit between 1.6 and 3 million bits of information per second,
thousands of times more information than our brains can process (Scitovsky 1976).
18Some authors (see Cabanac, 1971) suggested that people may use a metric like the money-metric to make
decisions. We can interpret our hedonic metric as a money-metric where the relative price is 1.
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residual optimization problem of maximizing V ()  L(U1()) by choosing only U1().1920 None
of the results depend on this simplication.21
With the new objective function Nature can let U1(c) = V (c) Uf2 (c), so that the individual
maximizes S(U(f(x; z))) = V (f(x; z)). Denote x(z) = argmaxx V (f(x; z)), and let c(z) =
f(x(z); z). The equilibrium tness would be: V (c(z))   L (U1(c(z))), which is less than the
First Best V (c(z)). However, since Uf2 () is xed we can no longer multiply U1(c) by an
arbitrarily small scalar (). And scaling only U1() would lead to a very ine¢ cient allocation of
e¤ort. But there are other ways in which Nature can avoid some of the tness costs associated
to L(). For instance, instead of scaling U1() we can translate it arbitrarily. For instance, let:
UT1 (c) = V (c)  Uf2 (c)  Ez
h
V (c(z))  Uf2 (c(z))
i
Since the last term is just a number, it does not a¤ect the optimization problem. The tness
in equilibrium will be:
V (c(z))  L

V (c(z))  Uf2 (c(z))  Ez
h
V (c(z))  Uf2 (c(z))
i
In expected value the tness increases. For a formal proof, re-write the problem in terms of
nding the optimal intercept (g): ming EzL

V (c(z))  Uf2 (c(z))  g

. If we assume that L()
belongs to the family of Bregman loss functions, then this is an optimal prediction problem and
we can apply Banerjee et al. (2005): i.e. the expectation, g = Ez
h
V (c(z))  Uf2 (c(z))
i
, is
the unique optimal Bregman predictor. Intuitively, the goal of the benchmark is to center U1()
such us on average the sensations are zero. This self-regulation mechanism is the very essence
of the model.
The asymmetric information problem faced by Nature is actually less serious. The within-
individual variation in z is much smaller than the across-individual variation in z. Nature
can take advantage of that in many di¤erent ways. In particular, we will present two general
mechanisms: mean-reverting utility and expectation-based preferences. This division tries to
follow that proposed by Kahneman (2000): the "hedonic treadmill" of Brickman et al. (1971),
based on the notion of adaptation level of Helson (1964), and the "satisfaction treadmill," which
invokes the notion of changing aspiration levels.
2.2. Mean-reverting utility. We will focus on the simplest of the scenarios. The organism
lives for two periods, and z is constant across time. Let superscript t denote the utility for
each period. For now, assume that the organism solves the optimization problem of each period
on a separate basis. In the rst period Nature will set U11 () = UT1 (), as given above. Let
U = UT1 (c
(z)) be the utility attained during the rst period. Nature can simply let U21 () =
UT1 ()  U . The term U is just a number, so it does not alter the optimization problem. Since
19The case studied here corresponds to the extreme situation where G(U) = 0 if U = Uf2 and  1 otherwise.
20Notice that we omit L(Uf2 ) because it is xed.
21The residual problem can also represent that the warning and defense roles predominate in more ancient parts
of the brain, so when Nature was shaping the preferences of the hominids it was probably solving something
similar to the residual problem.
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z is constant, Nature achieves the First Best during the second period. Intuitively, sensations
are regulated automatically, in a homeostatic fashion, hard-wired inside the systems of rewards
and punishments themselves.
However, a key assumption is that people do not anticipate that sensations are adapting over
time. As we said before, the evolutionary argument only needs this condition to be true for
the organisms that shaped the ancient parts of our brain, which is completely true. Moreover,
this condition would also be valid for early hominids and even hunter-gatherers. We leave for
later the question of whether people in modern times do or do not fully anticipate hedonic
adaptation (the evidence suggests that they do not), which is actually very important for the
welfare implications. On the other hand, the assumption about z being constant is just an
extreme simplication. As long as z describes a regular pattern over time, Nature can exploit
adaptive mechanism to achieve hedonic adaptation. Intuitively, when an individual faces greater
consumption Nature "learns" about the new environment and updates the utility function as to
minimize the tness costs from L().22 The reward system adapts just like the human olfactory
system adapts to continuous stimuli, so that the odor becomes unnoticed.
Unfortunately, in the literature there is plenty of confusion about what is hedonic adaptation
and what is not. For instance, some authors use addiction or relative deprivation almost as
interchangeable with hedonic adaptation. That is very misleading. It is true that the benchmark
does not have to depend directly on past utility. For instance, Nature can use a consumption
benchmark: i.e. U21 (c) = U
T
1 (c c1) UT1 (0), where c1 is past consumption. However, the essence
of addiction is not that the level of utility adapts, but instead that marginal utility changes with
the cue (Laibson, 2001). We can illustrate this with a real-life example. Jones et al. (1979)
gave to a group of people equal doses of heroin every day. Although the e¤ects were euphoric at
the beginning, they decreased over time and by the 19th day were almost nonexistent. That is
genuine hedonic adaptation. However, there is a second phenomenon beyond adaptation, that
of addiction, since the marginal utility from heroin goes up.23 There are other more important
evolutionary reasons why Nature would choose cue-consumption instead of just mean-reverting
utility: e.g. Smith and Tasnádi (2007). Likewise, consumption of other individuals in the group
can be used to form a benchmark: if cp denotes the mean consumption among the peers, then
U1(c) = U
T
1 (c  cp) UT1 (0) can do the trick as long as there is some intra-group correlation in
z. But there are other more important reasons why Nature would use peer comparisons instead
of just mean-reverting utility: e.g. Samuelson (2004).
2.3. Expectation-based Preferences. We can go back to the static model. Suppose that
the individual can predict z, and denote the prediction ze. Let U^1(c) = V (c)   Uf2 (c), and let
c(z) be the consumption resulting from those preferences. Nature can simply write the utility
function as follows: U1(c) = U^1(c)   U^1(c(ze)) (or equivalently, the individual may predict
22If instead of costly sensations you prefer to think about bounded sensations, the story is the same: Nature
translates the utility function and make the boundaries irrelevant.
23It is not surprising that addiction is so strongly associated with hedonic adaptation. Since the marginal utility
is increasing over time, in absence of hedonic adaptation the level of utility would achieve extremely high levels.
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directly ce). If ze is accurate, the individual will yield exactly zero sensations in equilibrium.
Note that this is possible insofar there are limitations to self-deception, or else we would lower
our expectations indenitely in order to boost happiness ad innitum. However, Nature cannot
rely exclusively on this mechanism simply because people can predict z only imperfectly.24
Expectation-based preferences are very easy to detect. Imagine that you are on a plane.
Minutes before landing the pilot says that there are serious technical di¢ culties, that you may
hear strange sounds, and that a successful emergency landing depends on everybody remaining
calm. Everything goes exactly as any other normal ight. However, if I measure how happy you
feel after getting o¤ the plane, you would feel probably much happier than if the pilot had not
made the announcement. Landing does not make you cry of happiness, not even smile, simply
because it is almost always safe. However, as soon as you learn that the probability of a plane
crash is signicant, a successful landing becomes the largest boost in happiness in months. Most
of your feelings are not a function of stimulus alone, but they also involve your mental model of
the world and the probabilities that you assign to thousands of events.
The role of expectations in the reward system is widely studied in neuroscience. Take as an
example dopamine, a neurotransmitter that is present in a wide variety of animals and fullls
a motivational role. Dopamine neurons encode the rewards in electrical impulses, which are
then distributed throughout the brain (for a non-technical introduction see Montague, 2006).
For instance, drugs like amphetamine and cocaine boost happiness in part by prolonging the
inuence of dopamine on target neurons. Recent physiological work identied the working of
dopaminergic neurons in primates. Figure 1, taken from Schultz et al. (1997), shows the typical
activity of a dopamine neuron. In the top panel, the subject receives a drop of appetitive
fruit juice, denoted as "Reward," which activates the dopamine neuron one instant later. The
medium panel shows what happens when subjects are given a conditioned stimulus that predicts
rewards (e.g. ringing a bell), denoted as "Prediction." After some learning, the dopamine neuron
is activated by the reward-predicting stimulus, but fails to be activated by the reward itself.
Finally, the bottom panel shows a situation in which the conditioned stimulus is given but the
reward is not. As in the previous situation, the activity of the dopamine neuron increases with
the conditioned stimulus, but then the dopamine depressed exactly at the time when the reward
should have occurred.
Intuitively, bursts of impulse activity mean that the reward is more than expected, a pause
means that the reward is less than expected, and no change means reward is just as expected.
The dopamine system is just one of the many neurological mechanisms that neuroscientists are
beginning to unveil. However, we suspect that the principle above is present in many other
reward systems in the brain. The evidence surrounds us. When the Argentinean soccer team tie
against that of Jamaica, the fans of Jamaica are happier than the fans of Argentina. When Apple
advertises its new laptop, consumers are suddenly less happy with their current computers.
24Notice that this mechanism of hedonic adaptation is not homeostatic, since it works outside the reward system
itself: e.g. it may involve peoples beliefs and perceptions about their environment and themselves, which may
be stored in other regions of the brain.
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Figure 1. Dopamine activity, taken from Schultz et al. (1997).
If we can understand the formation of expectations better, there are many applications for
expectation-based preferences. For instance, advertising (more than 2% of GDP in the US)
works to a great extent by manipulating peoples expectations. Research in some industries
(e.g. pharmaceutical) may consist on a treadmill of expectations, resulting in both excessive
consumption and excessive R&D. And so on and so forth.
2.4. A test. As aforementioned, there is a lot of evidence on adaptation to many sensations
without warning or defense roles. We refer the reader to Frederick et al. (1999) for an extensive
review. The key prediction of our model is that we should not nd much adaptation for sen-
sations with defense and warning roles. But before continuing, we need to make an important
clarication. Even though we keep mentioning the human olfactory, that is a sensory habitua-
tion and should be taken as a metaphor only. Sensory habituation is when someone immerses
his foot in very cold water and after a couple of minutes stops feeling pain. Under situations of
extreme pain, the body releases endorphin to block the pain messages coming from the body.
This does not mean that U2() is adapting, because minutes is not the time scale of our model.
Adaptation to U2() would be if someone immerses his foot a couple of minutes every day for a
month and after the 31st day he immerses his foot and he does not feel pain anymore. That this
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would be fatal from a tness point of view, because the individual would be able to "ignore"
the weather and would eventually die from hypothermia.25
It is a fact that fever, pain, and the main defense systems do not adapt, since they would
stop being defenses if they were to adapt. And the same is true for warning systems, since an
alarm that can be ignored would not be an alarm in the rst place. Since it is too obvious,
scientists have not performed formal tests. However, we were able to nd a couple of studies
on the matter. Firstly, sound perception plays an important warning role. Among other uses
during our evolutionary history, the auditive system alerted either the presence of a predator or
the presence of a pray. As expected, Weinstein (1982) interviewed a panel of residents for four
months and sixteen months after a highway was opened and found that there is no adaptation
whatsoever to noise. Moreover, the conclusions are supported by many subsequent studies (see
Weinstein, 1982). The second example is about the human irritant sense, which is the chemical
sensitivity of the mucosae (e.g. ocular, nasal). For instance, people who lack the sense of smell
(anosmic) can detect airborne chemicals only through the irritant sense. This sense makes it
impossible for the individual to remain in toxic environments, which is a clear defense role. As
expected, Cometto-Muniz et al. (1992) found practically no adaptation to pungent, harmful
chemicals.
Finally, we must mention that there are some studies arguing that chronic pain patients
exhibit higher than normal thresholds for various types of experimental pain (e.g. Meskey et
al., 1975). It is perfectly reasonable to expect some adaptation to pain if the injuries are chronic:
i.e. intense sensations are meant to elicit behavior (e.g. step out of the re), and if the situation
is chronic that would not be useful anymore. However, the validity of the ndings is weak.
As Dar et al. (1995) suggest, painful experiences do not change the intensity of pain but the
internal anchor points for the subjective evaluation of pain. Peters et al. (1992) shows that even
though chronic pain patients reported higher tolerance to pain, they did not di¤er in objective
measures such as nociceptive exion reex (a measure of spinal nociceptive processes). Finally,
the estimates are not reduced-form estimates but simple mean comparisons, which can simply
reect the mere fact that those who once were less afraid from getting injured have on average
more tolerance to pain.
2.5. Discussion. We showed that mean-reverting utility and expectation-based preferences are
two simple ways of achieving hedonic adaptation. However, it is not trivial why Nature may
be interested in establishing benchmarks in one way or the other. For instance, the storage
of detailed information on expected consumption may be costly for the organism, while the
information on past sensations may be readily available.26 In any case, it is likely that each
reward system combines more than one adaptation mechanism. Also, we can generalize the
25The same distinction is true for sensations in U1(): if someone consumes three cups of co¤ee and enjoys
relatively less the third cup, that is not adaptation (in a daily consumption model it would be decreasing
marginal utility). We have adaptation if someone consumes a cup of co¤ee every day and the 30th day he does
not feel happier after drinking a co¤ee, although he would feel unhappy about not drinking one (i.e. because he
expects to drink a co¤ee).
26Also, the organism may be less prone to self-deception than anticipating hedonic adaptation.
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results by adding another sensation without a defense or warning role, U3(c). The tness cost
would not be L(U1(c) + U3(c)), but something like: L(U1(c)) + L(U3(c)). As studies from
neuroscience show, there is not such a thing as a single continuum from good to bad feelings.
People can feel sad and happy at the same time, and an increment of pleasure does not cancel
out an equal increment of pain (Larsen et al., 2001). It would be straightforward to show that
each sensation will have its own regulation mechanism (e.g. pleasure from eating will adapt
separately from sexual pleasure).
We have intentionally ignored the duration of hedonic experiences. Sensations are not instan-
taneous, and our hedonic metric values more lasting and frequent sensations. Some sensations
may yield delayed rewards, which may be smoothed over minutes, days or even months.27 Sen-
sations with secondary roles have restrictions on the length of the hedonic states they trigger.
For instance, an organism should detect right away that it is on re: it would be fatal if pain
was delayed just a matter of seconds. There are also restrictions on sensations that have no
secondary roles, as their timing must allow the individual to easily distinguish a causal link
between stimuli and sensations. In the extreme case, if all sensations were evenly "smoothed"
over the life-cycle, it would be literally impossible to discover our own preferences. We did not
explore this dimension simply because it is not crucial to the main argument of the paper.
Finally, we must refer to Rayo and Becker (2005), who asked the very same question that we
address. Their elegant model provides a deep understanding of the principal-agent metaphor
between Nature and the living organisms. However, they assume that intense sensations are
always costly when actually the exact opposite is true for sensations with defense or warning
roles: e.g. a high intensity of pain is benecial from a tness point of view. Also, contrary to
their model, a good sensation and a bad sensation cannot cancel each other out (see Larsen et
al., 2001). Instead, they start with the assumption that people cannot perceive small di¤erences
in sensations. Indeed, that biological fact is one of the results of our model. Intuitively, there is
an optimal intensity of pain and other defense and warning sensations due to the secondary roles,
Uf2 (c). The intensity of the other sensations are determined as "proportional" to the former:
i.e. U1(c) = V (c)   Uf2 (c). As a consequence, Nature does not need to develop sensation-
centers capable of perceiving di¤erences in sensations that are extremely small with respect to
the intensity of Uf2 (c).
28 Indeed, we can even approximate a denition of the "accuracy" of a
sensation-center: e.g. the individual should not be able to distinguish variations in sensations
that are very small (e.g. by a factor of 10 10) with respect to the intensity of pain. Last but
not the least, Rayo and Becker (2005) cannot explain why some sensations adapt strongly (e.g.
27For instance, Diener et al. (1991) argue that the sensations we recognize as happiness is more about frequency
than about intensity.
28It is true that there may be physical and chemical boundaries in the sensation-centers such as it is impossible
to detect extremely weak sensations (e.g. neurotransmitters cannot be the size of a hydrogen atom). In any
case, we saw that sensations with defense and warning roles, Uf2 (c), must be intense in an absolute sense. Since
all the sensations are "proportional" to the latter, the chemical boundaries will not be relevant in designing the
experienced utility of the organism.
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dopamine) while others almost do not adapt at all (e.g. irritory sense, pain). And as we show in
the following section, that disctintion is very important for the welfare and policy implication.
3. Consequences of Hedonic Adaptation
One of the most important questions for the welfare implications is whether people in modern
times do or do not anticipate adaptation (recall that this is not relevant for the evolutionary
argument). If adaptation is signicant but people do not recognize it, then people will make
excessive e¤ort/consumption in the activity/good that is subject to relatively more adaptation.
Indeed, this is actually an application of the case of "projection biases" introduced by Loewen-
stein et al. (2003). The evidence suggests that people do not fully anticipate that their hedonic
state will bounce back to "normal" levels after a bad or good event, even after having experi-
enced such bounces more than once. For example, Riis et al. (2005) found that hemodialysis
patients, after a while, have a level of happiness similar to that of healthy people, but at rst,
when trying to forecast, fail to anticipate this bounce-back in well-being. We must notice that
the issue is still not resolved, since recent papers are challenging the evidence (e.g. Smith et al.,
2006)
Denote naïve agents (i.e. do not anticipate hedonic adaptation) and sophisticate agents (i.e.
anticipate adaptation) using superscripts n and s, respectively. Since the sensations associated
with working are closely related to the warning and defense mechanisms (e.g. pain, stress),
we will assume that they do not adapt. Since most of the consumption activities trigger sen-
sations that are not related to secondary roles (e.g. eating, having fun), we will model them
as subject to hedonic adaptation. The agent chooses e¤ort (lt) and consumption (ct) in every
period. Let  denote the discount factor, and let 0    1= be the parameter that mea-
sures hedonic adaptation. A naïve maximizes his perceived lifetime utility from consumption:
U(ct) +  U(ct+1) + 
2 U(ct+2) + (:::). We will focus on the simplest hedonic habituation: for
every unit of utility from consumption at t Nature will "subtract"  units at t + 1. Therefore,
a sophisticate agent maximizes: U(ct) +  [U(ct+1)  U(ct)] + (:::), which by construction is
the actual lifetime utility. The ow of (dis)utility from working is  P (lt). Assume U() and
P () satisfy the Inada conditions.29 The total utility is simply the utility from consumption
plus the (dis)utility from working. Denote C = fcsg1s=t and L = flsg1s=t. Let BC be the set of
consumption and labor decisions fC;Lg such as the intertemporal budget constraint is satised
and work e¤ort and consumption are always non-negative. Also, we assume that BC is such as
the solution to the problem is interior.
There are two important results from this model. First, if all sensations were subject to the
same rate of adaptation, then people would make e¢ cient choices even if they were naïve:
arg max
fC;Lg2BC
(1  )
1X
s=t
s [U(ct)  P (lt)] = arg maxfC;Lg2BC
1X
s=t
s [U(ct)  P (lt)]
29Otherwise, a corner solution for the sophisticate may appear where he would never work nor consume.
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Secondly, if di¤erent sensations had di¤erent rates of adaptation, the problem for an agent
of type i 2 fn; sg would be:
max
fC;Lg2BC
1X
s=t
s

iU(ct)  P (lt)

Where n = 1 (naïve), and s = 1    (sophisticate). From the First Order Conditions
we can see that the Euler equation is not a¤ected by i. The only di¤erence between naïve
and sophisticate arises in the intra-temporal allocation between consumption and labor (more
generally, between activities subject and not subject to hedonic adaptation). Because the naïve
do not anticipate that a share  of the pleasure from consumption will bounce back, they engage
in excessive e¤ort and consumption. The same idea is extensible to the case of expectation-based
preferences. People may fail to account (at least partially) that some hedonic states are functions
of expectations, and thus they will over-engage in such activities. The naïve agent chasing higher
and higher expectations may end up less happy than a sophisticate agent who decided to settle
for a lower standard of living.
Those biases can be easily corrected by imposing a Pigou tax on labor or consumption. Indeed,
those biases can actually be a blessing. For instance, the social insurance benets from income
taxation can be enjoyed only to a limited extent because of the usual moral hazard problem.
But according to this model, in absence of taxes people would work too much. That means
that introducing income taxes makes people work a more e¢ cient number of hours, not a less
e¢ cient number of hours. In other words, hedonic adaptation with naive individuals alleviates
the usual moral-hazard problem brought by income taxation, which increases substantially the
optimal tax rate and the equilibrium social insurance. A formal argument is available upon
request. Also, we refer the reader to Perez Truglia (2010), whose argument is very similar in
spirit to the one given above.
It is very di¢ cult to test whether people anticipate hedonic adaptation or not. After all,
not even modern scientists agree about the existence of hedonic adaptation.30 Indeed, Nature
could have hard-wired us in such a way that it is di¢ cult for us to outsmart the system. That
possibility would demand a model of its own. However, we will sketch the basic intuition in the
next subsection.
3.1. Anticipating adaptation. The question is whether Nature could have hard-wired us in
such a way that it is di¢ cult for us to outsmart the system. First notice that the greater  the
less the di¤erences in behavior between naïve and sophisticate introduced by  > 0. Nature
could have used more complex adaptation rules. For example, current utility may be negatively
a¤ected by the mean utility during the last N periods: U(ct)   1N
PN
s=1 U(ct s). Starting at
period N we get the original problem with n = 1 and s = 1   1  1+
N
N . The distortion
brought by sophisticate agents decreases rapidly as we increase N . Intuitively, the impact of
current consumption on future adaptation is "smoothed" over N periods. Indeed, we would get
30A standard counter-argument would say that people could simply anticipate adaptation at an unconscious
level, or through adaptive behavior.
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a similar result by just using as a benchmark the utility from N periods ago.31 Furthermore,
Nature could have completely eliminated the distortions in a rather simple way: by multiplying
the U() of the sophisticate by 1=s, in which case the problems of both types become the
same. This solution is impossible if  = 1 , but even if  is not one but close to one it is
still problematic: we would have a utility function for the sophisticate with asymptotic mean
zero, but extremely "steep." As soon as we incorporate stochastic shocks, this strategy will face
limitations.
It would be interesting to consider a model where people learnabout  over time, while they
cognitively process past information on stimuli and hedonic responses. In particular, we should
expect t to be increasing in t.
32 However, people seem to fail at anticipating adaptation even
when the event is experienced more than once. Moreover, there is vast evidence on imperfect
a¤ective forecasting beyond the particular case of hedonic adaptation (for an extensive review
see Loewenstein et al., 1999, 2003). In the last three million years the human brain tripled in
size, mainly because of the growth of the frontal lobe and its prefrontal cortex. One of the core
roles of this structure is the ability to make predictions (Banyas, 1999). If Nature gave us a
"simulator" capable of predictions beyond the computational power of the most advanced super-
computers, there must be a reason why we cannot forecast the simplest hedonic experiences.
Hedonic adaptation may provide an explanation for this puzzle: thanks to imperfect a¤ective
forecasting, Nature can prevent us from "outsmarting" the system.
3.2. An application: psychological defenses. Each sensation has its own (relatively) inde-
pendent adaptation mechanism, and habituation may change dramatically from one sensation
to another. For instance, we have not yet discussed the timing of the hedonic adjustments: they
could be gradual or prompt, partially or completely automatic, and so on. To illustrate the
kind of characteristics that shape the dynamics of adaptation, in this section we will provide
an application to a particular class of sensations: psychological states (e.g. anger, sadness).
Psychologists have long recognized that hedonic states trigger processes to attenuate the phys-
iological impact (e.g. Taylor, 1991), ranging from homeostatic processes (e.g. Sandvik et al.,
1985) to what they call defensive processes (e.g. Freud, 1937).
We have already discussed that the costs associated to very intense sensations (stress, lack
of concentration, etc.) are convex. The other building block of the model is the fact that
psychological processes that attenuate distress may have costs (Lazarus, 1985; Richards et al.,
2000; Wegner et al., 1993), and thus they tend to be triggered only when distress passes a
critical threshold. This is known as the region- Paradox (Gilbert et al., 2004). Intuitively,
people trigger psychological defenses when they face the death of a relative, but they do not
trigger such defenses when their favorite shirt gets stained. You can nd three experiments
that illustrate this idea in Gilbert et al. (2004). To model this phenomenon we will use an Ss
31In both cases the results are limited during the rst I < N periods, since there is not enough "history."
32However, individuals should be naïve about future selves: i.e. at time t people should act as if s = t 8s  t.
That is to say, this version of hedonic adaptation would bring dynamically inconsistent preferences.
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model.33 Assume that the individual is solving a maximization problem, which results in an
hedonic state (H) that follows an Ito process with slope  and variance : dH = dt + dz,
where dz is a Wiener Process. We assume that Nature already shaped the optimal incentives, so
we only need to solve the residual problem of minimizing the tness costs from intense sensations
(L() in the previous model). The tness cost from intense sensations are convex in the level of
the hedonic state: C   b2H2, where C represents the tness of an individual with a completely
neutral hedonic state, and b is a parameter that scales the tness cost.
Nature can hard-wire an individual to make his hedonic state automatically jump up or
down when some pre-determined thresholds are reached: i.e. if Ai is the size of the adjustment
i and hi is the corresponding threshold, happiness will jump from hi to hi + Ai (if the jump
is upwards) or hi   Ai (if it is downwards) as soon as the hedonic state reaches hi. In biology
this is known as homeostasis: there are detectors that monitor when a system departs from
"set-points." As before, we will assume that people do not anticipate adaptation, so the path
of H is independent from the shape of the psychological defenses.34 There may be two tness
costs associated to such jumps: xed costs (Ci) and variable costs (ci), all of them non-negative,
where the index i 2 fU;Dg indicates that the costs can be di¤erent for upwards and downwards
jumps. Denote A to the set of all possible adjustments. For every a 2 A, denote (n) to the
date of the nth adjustment, C(n) to the tness cost of the nth adjustment, and A(n) to the
size of nth adjustment. If a 2 A is the path of adjustments, then the resulting path of hedonic
states is Ht(a). The problem of Nature is the following:
V (H) = max
a2A
Et
8<:
1Z
=t
e ( t)

  b
2
H (a)
2

d  
1X
n=1
e ((n) t)C(n)
9=;
C(n) =
(
CU + cUA(n) if A(n)  0
CD + cD jA(n)j if A(n) < 0
Where  is the discount rate. The solution to the model is that Nature hard-wires the
following automatic adjustments: if the hedonic state goes down to U , then it bounces up
to u  U ; and if the hedonic state goes up to D, it is adjusted down up to d  D. We can
study how the adjustment mechanism changes when we modify the underlying parameters of the
model. To begin with, higher hedonic volatility () makes it more likely that a random change
will move the hedonic process closer to zero, thereby increasing Natures willingness to refrain
from making an adjustment: U decreases and D increases. An increase in hedonic growth ()
makes all U , u, D and d go down: the probability of hitting the upper (lower) bound increases
(decreases), so the thresholds change accordingly. If we increase the tness costs of sensations
33Among others, widely used in economic modeling of investment decisions by rms (e.g. Bertola et al., 1990).
34Suppose that instead people knew that if happiness goes down to U then it automatically bounces back to u.
We should then see, from time to time, people between u and U "harming themselves" as to fall down to U and
bounce back to u. To the best of our knowledge there is no evidence of such self-destructive enterprises to take
advantage of the psychological defenses.
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(b) then more frequent and bigger adjustments will be desired, so U and u decreases while D
and d increases. If there are no variable costs of adjustment then, conditionally on making an
adjustment, Nature would always seek to adjust to the same point: i.e. u = d if cU = cD = 0
(and particularly u = d = 0 if  = 0). If there are no xed costs for adjustments, then Nature
will make an innitesimal adjustment when the marginal cost of an adjustment falls just below
the expected loss from a marginal change in H: i.e. u = U and d = D if CU = CD = 0.
As we wanted to stress, the form of the hedonic adaptation depends sensibly on the deep
biological fundamentals at hand.35 Consider two simple examples: fantasy and denial. On the
one hand, fantasy has a relatively larger xed cost, since the organism may need time and energy
to generate the fantasies regardless of whether the illusion is meant to rationalize the death of
a relative or the death of a pet. Denial does not seem to have a substantial xed cost, but it
certainly has a positive variable cost: e.g. denying that raspberries are delicious is from a tness
point of view much less dangerous than denying the law of gravity. Thus, in the case of negative
experiences, we should expect fantasy (relatively to denial) to have a lower threshold but trigger
greater jumps.
4. Conclusions
Many characteristics of our pleasure and pain systems can tell us a lot about our biological
design once we see them as a result of evolution. For instance, we wondered why Nature did not
give us a system of stochastic rewards, and the reason why we have a multiplicity of sensations.
Nature is a principal much smarter than some of her agents tend to believe. After taking into
consideration two simple biological facts, we showed that Nature must use utility functions with
self-regulation mechanisms. Furthermore, we showed that there will be di¤erential adaptation:
i.e. those sensations with strong defense and warning roles will not adapt. Jointly with the fact
that people does not fully anticipate adaptation, this determines that people will invest more
than optimal in those activities that have relatively more adaptation.
We hope that our model will give further theoretical support for the gradual incorporation of
adaptive utility functions into theoretical and empirical applications in economics (e.g. income
aspiration, consumption habituation). That will not only increase the number of behavioral
phenomena that we are able to explain, but it will also provide more accurate welfare predictions.
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